From Capacious Macaque, 6 Years ago, written in Plain Text.
Embed
  1.  
  2. Global Spying:
  3. Realistic Probabilities In Modern Signals Intelligence
  4. Jonathan Logan
  5. Steve Topletz (presenter, editing)
  6. PREFACE
  7. In this article
  8. ,
  9.  we will present insight to the realistic possibilities of Internet mass surveillance. When
  10. talking about the threat of Internet surveillance
  11. ,
  12.  the
  13. common
  14. argument is that there is so much traffic
  15. that any one conversation or email won't be picked up unless there is reason to suspect those
  16. concerned; it is impossible that
  17. they
  18. can
  19. listen to us all
  20. .
  21. This argument assumes that there is a scarcity of resources and motivation required for mass
  22. surveillance. The truth is that motivation and resources are directly connected. If the resources are
  23. inexpensive enough
  24. ,
  25.  then the motivations present are sufficient to use them. This is visible in the
  26. economic effect of supply availability increasing
  27.  the
  28.  demand. The effect is that since it is more easily
  29. done, it will be done more readily. Another fault in th
  30. e above
  31.  argument
  32.  is that it
  33.  assumes that there is
  34. only all-or-nothing surveillance, which is incorrect.
  35. INDEX
  36. I.
  37. Resource Requirements
  38. II.
  39. Methods of Post-Tap and Offsite Analysis
  40. III.
  41. Implications
  42. IV.
  43. Threat Assessment
  44. V.
  45. Clandestine Intelligence Gathering
  46. VI.
  47. End Notes
  48. VII.
  49. Q&A
  50. VIII.
  51. About the Authors
  52. IX.
  53. Exhibits
  54. X.
  55. Citations
  56. I. RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS
  57. It is important to break down the resources required and methods available as well as the means of
  58. surveillance
  59.  in order
  60.  to understand what realistic threat mass surveillance of digital communication is.
  61. The resources required are Access, Storage, Traffic, and Analysis. In this paper, we
  62. are
  63.  speaking about
  64. digital communications, and these methods do not fully apply to purely analog communication, such as
  65. POTS (normal telephone service).
  66. ACCESS
  67. Surveillence requires access to the communication to be surveilled. Data today is transmitted via
  68. copper cable lines, fiber-optics, directed micro-wave communication, broadcast radio (W
  69. i
  70. MAX
  71. ,WiFi
  72. etc.), satellite, and a few other arcane methods . The most profitable transmission media for
  73. surveillance, by far, are fiber, broadcast, directed micro-wave, and satellite. Fiber provides the benefit
  74. of large amount
  75. s
  76.  of data from a single “cable.” Broadcast radio provides the benefit of non-physical
  77. accessibility. Directed micro-wave is easily acquired through classic stand-in-the-middle listening.
  78. Satellite provides a very big footprint, where one needs only to be standing near the receiver of the
  79. transmission.
  80. Fiber cables provide the most interesting targets for surveillance. Almost all international
  81. communication eventually goes over a few particular fiber lines, so this is where the tapping is focused.
  82. This is a practice far different from the UK / USA Echelon system of the 1980s
  83. ,
  84.  which operated mostly
  85. by targeting direct micro-wave and satellite transmissions, because international fiber-optic lines were
  86. more rare. Today, tapping into fiber is easily accomplished through a variety of methods:
  87. splicing the
  88. fiber-optic line, connecting to the repeaters, or tapping into the endpoint routers
  89. ,
  90.  and
  91.  through
  92.  even
  93. more esoteric methods
  94. ,
  95.  like bending the fiber and detecting stray “ghost” photons
  96. 1
  97. . Tapping in most
  98. cases is purely passive, which means two things. First, the signals are being listened to and not
  99. intercepted or modified. Second, surveillance
  100. -
  101. induced artifacts are non-trivial to detect by the endpoint,
  102. which means there is no
  103. click
  104.  on the phone to tell you that someone is listening in. This is especially
  105. true in digital communications espionage, which is the focus of this paper.
  106. Access to fiber-optic lines is mostly accomplished by connecting to repeaters and tapping endpoint
  107. routers. That is what is being performed by AT&T at the request of the NSA. This method is
  108. inexpensive in resources
  109.  and
  110.  easy to implement,
  111. plus it
  112.  requires very few people to know
  113.  about it
  114.  and
  115. to
  116.  operate
  117.  it
  118. . In the case of repeater connections, even the fiber owner
  119. s
  120.  may not be aware
  121.  that their
  122. lines are being tapped
  123.  unless they find the tap during routine maintenance.
  124. Civilians generally assume that the Internet consists of millions of independent lines that would have to
  125. be tapped individually for mass surveillance. Luckily for signal
  126. s
  127.  intelligence gathering and analysis,
  128. this is not the case. To tap into 90% of traffic connecting the Eastern Hemisphere to the Western
  129. Hemisphere (GUS / RUS / AFRICA / MIDDLE EAST / EU to US), agencies only need access to either
  130. 30 fiber cables
  131. 2
  132.  or half of the 45 landing points
  133. 3
  134. . An alternate method to achieve such access to this
  135. traffic is to install access devices in just
  136. seven
  137.  of the correct
  138. Internet Exchanges
  139. 4
  140.  (I
  141. Xs
  142. ), which
  143. are
  144. where ISPs and backbones interconnect at a single location. Rest assured, all of above has happened at
  145. various scales
  146. 5
  147.  as intelligence agencies are pitted against each other to gain power through knowledge.
  148. are as a surveillance target. In fact, anyone reading this paper, especially those reading it
  149. online
  150. for a
  151. longer time or
  152. increased
  153.  frequency, would almost certainly elevate their status as a surveillance target.
  154. Staying below the radar can be extremely hard if you are in any way different
  155. from
  156.  the majority of the
  157. populus.
  158. When surveillance becomes trivial for an unrestrained party
  159. ,
  160.  then it will be done, and sadly
  161. ,
  162.  there is no
  163. good reason that they should not do it if
  164.  they are
  165.  unrestrained. Most of the notions against the reality of
  166. mass surveillance are based on "scarcity of resources and motivation"
  167. arguments.
  168.  It has been
  169. demonstrated
  170. in this document
  171. that there is no scarcity of resources to do surveillance or store its
  172. results, only to act upon it by human resources. In our current world, there is no scarcity of motivation
  173. to do it
  174.  either
  175. . In fact, there is a whole industry and even political parties lobbying on the behalf of
  176. surveillance. There are enough power-hungry people that want to stay in power and institutions
  177. that
  178. exist to self-perpetuate
  179. . Someone once said that the Internet is not only the best tool for mass
  180. communication but also the best tool for mass surveillance and control ever created. That person was
  181. right.
  182. V. CLANDESTINE INTELLIGENCE GATHERING
  183. Clandestine intelligence gathering is spying performed by agencies and corporations that do not have
  184. "lawful interception"
  185. 28
  186.  privileges, lacking legal authority and legitimate access to infrastructure. This is
  187. the traditional idea of espionage, where one country or company is spying on another or a target group.
  188. The stages are similar to traditional surveillance; however, the methods used tend to be less traditional
  189. since the spying organization involved does not have conventional communications access but
  190. also
  191. is
  192. not confined by the rule of law.
  193. Clandestine intelligence may be as insignificant as one auto dealer spying on another to gain an
  194. advantage
  195. 29
  196. , or as disturbing as a country spying on the government employees of a rival country to
  197. cripple their defense infrastructure in preparation for
  198. a future war
  199. 30
  200. .
  201. Data collection for clandestine operations follows the path of least resistance
  202. ,
  203.  depending on the
  204. objective. Because clandestine data collection is not lawful, it cannot be overtly employed,
  205. but
  206.  instead
  207. ,
  208. it
  209.  must be covertly deployed using either Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) or
  210. "covert
  211. intelligence
  212. "
  213. techniques. Open Source Intelligence gathering "involves finding, selecting, and acquiring information
  214. from publicly available sources and analyzing it to produce actionable intelligence... The term
  215. open
  216. refers to overt, publicly available sources"
  217. 31
  218.  as opposed to
  219. covert intelligence
  220.  which refers to
  221. private,
  222. classified,
  223. or illegal
  224.  sources.
  225. One example of
  226. an
  227. Open Source Intelligence gathering source is the Tor Network. The Tor Network is
  228. an anonymity network that is participation-based and allows anyone to access communications traffic
  229. of i
  230. t
  231. s users
  232. ; however, it also
  233.  attempts to obfuscate the origins of the traffic in order to render the user
  234. anonymous. The inherent weakness of the Tor
  235. N
  236. etwork is that each node in the network acts like a
  237. miniature
  238. IX
  239. , routing the traffic of other users
  240.  and
  241.  giving easy eavesdropping access to anyone who
  242. wants to abuse it. The Tor
  243. N
  244. etwork provides an endless supply of interesting traffic, specifically
  245. because the users are those who wish not to be observed or identified. Because this traffic is
  246. both
  247. suspicious
  248.  and
  249.  interesting, it is the natural target of surveillance by both
  250. state
  251. agencies
  252. 32
  253.  and hackers
  254. 33
  255. .
  256. In an
  257. O
  258. pen
  259. S
  260. ource
  261. I
  262. ntelligence gathering model, the spying organization might operate Tor nodes and
  263. perform traffic analysis to identify political dissidents
  264. 34
  265. , capture sensitive government credentials
  266. 35
  267. ,
  268. and even to deanonymize
  269. 36
  270.  and correlate traffic back to reporters, bloggers, and governments agents.
  271. C
  272. overt
  273.  intelligence gathering for clandestine surveillance uses non-traditional methods to acquire
  274. communications access. These are typically
  275. B
  276. lack Ops programs which employ trojans
  277. 37
  278. , bribery,
  279. blackmail
  280. 38
  281. , misdirection
  282. 39
  283. , and infiltration
  284. 40
  285. .
  286. VI. END NOTES
  287. This article exclusively deals with the possibilities and methods for passive surveillance of non-
  288. participants of the communication being surveilled. There are numerous other methods of surveillance
  289. and data collection existing on the Internet. Those include cookies, spyware, log file aggregation,
  290. system fingerprinting, and many other methods.
  291. VII. Q&A
  292. Q: What about using word scrambling to defeat language analysis?
  293. A: The technology used in most word processors is good enough to instantly reconstruct large portions
  294. of a scrambled text.
  295. The approaches by s
  296. ystems working with semantic analysis, context and subject
  297. discovery
  298. ,
  299.  as well as whole text probability
  300. ,
  301.  are even better. They might not be able to reconstruct every  
  302. single word
  303. ,
  304.  but
  305.  rather, just
  306.  enough of the content to make sense of it. The same is true for most if not
  307. all "good advice" given by friends. Good security is not that easy. If advice does not include strong
  308. cryptography, it is uninformed at best, and disinformation at worst.
  309. Q: Are encryption users more likely to become targets?
  310. A: As mentioned in the article
  311. ,
  312.  one of the methods used is to find out unusual traffic and content
  313. patterns. Using e
  314. -
  315. mail encryption is something unusual for the normal population. There have been
  316. several cases where the use of encryption increased the interest of investigating agencies. However
  317. ,
  318.  we
  319. still think that it is a necessary and smart
  320. move
  321.  to encrypt everything you can. Surely you cannot beat
  322. context analysis with encryption alone, but content analysis and interpretation can be
  323. rendered
  324.  much
  325. less effective or even impossible.
  326. The advi
  327. c
  328. e we would give is to encrypt all your communication
  329. every time
  330. . It is better to have a
  331. consistent communication pattern than to only encrypt occasionally because the total amount of
  332. valuable data collected will be lower. If you are only encrypting information you think is sensitive, then
  333. it is also known which communications should be more heavily analyzed.
  334. Q: Are people using anonymity networks more likely to become targets?
  335. A: Yes. The total number of available anonymization services is small. Just a few thousand computers
  336. in total are serving in publicly available anonymity networks. To target all traffic going to or from those
  337. computers is trivial. However
  338. ,
  339.  only a really big adversary
  340. would
  341.  be able to automatically trace and
  342. connect the various relayed packets to each other, and those adversaries surely exist.
  343. Looking at the network layouts of the more popular anonymization networks
  344. ,
  345.  it is actually not hard to
  346. watch all traffic they relay. Some services make it hard to identify single communication events when
  347. watching only a limited set of the total connections that exist
  348. ;
  349.  at the same time
  350. , this increases
  351. the
  352. crowding effect (hiding in the crowd). With effectively executed crowding, you will be seen but not
  353. necessarily identified.
  354. Q: But company X said they use technology Y
  355. .
  356.  W
  357. on't that protect me from all adversaries?
  358. A: No. It is true that technologies exist to drastically increase your privacy on the Internet. However,
  359. none of them protect you against an omnipotent attacker. Most are good for evading nosy marketing
  360. groups,
  361. though
  362. few are good enough to hide yourself from the eyes of domestic security agencies.
  363. However, none will protect you against a motivated attacker with global access to the Internet. If your
  364. anonymization service is decent
  365. ,
  366.  then they will have a note in their website or documentation that
  367. effectively states
  368. ,
  369.  "
  370. D
  371. o not rely on this technology if you require strong anonymity." If they aren't
  372. decent,
  373. they will say
  374. ,
  375.  "
  376. W
  377. e make you 100% anonymous on the Internet."
  378. Q: What can be done?
  379. A: Writing to your congressional representive will not stop spying. Politics and public opinion will not
  380. help at all to reduce or even solve this problem, because politics and public naivet
  381. e
  382.  created the
  383. problem. There are only
  384. seven
  385.  things you can effectively do:
  386. 1.
  387. Accept that the world is
  388. not
  389.  a place where everyone believes others should be free.
  390. 2.
  391. Use self-defense technology such as
  392. adequate
  393.  anonymity services and best practices.
  394. 3.
  395. Use encryption on all your traffic, and support programs that employ opportunistic encryption.
  396. Even weak and poorly-implemented encryption is better than plaintext, because it cripples
  397. spying by reducing it to context analysis.
  398. 4.
  399. Call up your ISP and tell them you want a dynamic IP address, because static IP addresses are a
  400. threat to your privacy. If you work at an ISP, insist that it assigns IP addresses dynamically, not
  401. statically.
  402. 5.
  403. Prepend common data to the first 1k of your data transfers to defeat modern checksum analysis.
  404. 6.
  405. Fight against any force that wants you to give up your freedoms and privacy.
  406. 7.
  407. Teach others how to fight for their privacy as well.
  408. Protecting your privacy does not come for free today, and it never has. One last word to the wise:
  409.  t
  410. hose
  411. that shout the loudest that they will protect you or those that do it for free are not necessarily those that
  412. have your freedom and privacy in mind
  413. .
  414.  T
  415. here
  416. is
  417. n
  418. o
  419. s
  420. uch
  421. t
  422. hing
  423. a
  424. s
  425. a
  426. f
  427. ree
  428. l
  429. unch!
  430. VIII. ABOUT THE AUTHORS
  431. Jonathan Logan works as a communication network consultant for Cryptohippie PA Inc. and Xero
  432. Networks AG. He can be reached via email at j.logan at cryptohippie.net (PGP Key: 0xE82210E6)
  433. Steve Topletz is the operations advisor for XeroBank, an anonymity service operated by Xero
  434. Networks AG. The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author
  435. s
  436.  and do not reflect the
  437. views of Cryptohippie PA Inc.,  Xero Networks AG, their management, or their respective owners. If
  438. you want to distribute this article
  439. ,
  440.  please contact the author
  441. s
  442. .
  443. IX. EXHIBITS
  444. Note: Figures used in calculations are designed to be rough and larger than actual costs, in order to
  445. demonstrate maximum reasonable costs.
  446. Exhibit A: (
  447. http://www.dtc.umn.edu/mints/home.php
  448. ) 5000 ~ 8000 PB / month. Presume ~85
  449. th
  450. percentile at 7500 Petabytes * 12 months = ~90 Exabytes (94,371,840,000 GB). Data warehousing
  451. costs are approximated to $0.35 / GB / year, ($0.168 / GB hardware, $0.014 / GB power, $0.091 / GB
  452. housing, $0.077 / GB maintenance; breakdown derived from classified source, traffic costs not
  453. included).  94,371,840,000 GB * $0.35 / GB = $33,030,144,000 USD / year.
  454. Exhibit
  455. B
  456. : 1% *
  457. (94,371,840,000 GB)
  458.  x $0.02 / GB
  459. fiber-optic transfer
  460.  x 2 destinations
  461. (
  462. collection and
  463. endpoint)
  464. = $37,748,736 total fiber-optic transmission costs. Note that although internet traffic doubles,
  465. unique traffic does not increase at the same rate, so 1% is a shrinking figure as total traffic increases.
  466. Non-unique traffic is typically limited to personal communications such as VOIP, email, and instant
  467. messaging.
  468. Exhibit C: IBM BladeCenter PN41, 20 Gbps @ $90,000 =  $4.5k / Gbps. Similar costs across the board
  469. (90k wholesale, 106k ~ 120k retail) with other DPI / traffic analysis solutions (Narus, Sandvine, LSI,
  470. Qosmos, Interphase, Ellacoya etc).
  471. Exhibit D: ~90 Exabytes raw analysis / 1 year = ~24 Tbps (23.36) average usage (20Tbps domestic, 4
  472. Tbps international) @ 20% utilization = 117 Tbps (@ 100% utilization) x $4.5k Gbps  =  $526,500,000
  473. USD. Hardware has a yearly cost of 48% of costs before traffic (power, housing, maintenance). Costs
  474. before traffic are $570,375,000 ($526,500,000 / 0.48 * 0.52), and traffic costs of $37,748,736 bring the
  475. total to  $1,134,623,736 for all costs post-tap / pre-analysis.
  476. Exhibit E: Maximum 5000 tapping points worldwide x $3,000,000 / tap / year for physical surveillance,
  477. compliance, black operations, tap installation, and maintenance, and upkeep costs. In Germany alone,
  478. there are 30 major backbone loops, and 10 major IXs, which require multiple taps for total surveillance.
  479. Exhibit F: The cost of Access is $2.027b, consisting of $527m for Traffic Analysis, and $1.5b in Tap
  480. Installation and Management (Exhibit E). The cost of Storage is $570m (Exhibit D), favoring the larger
  481. cost against the 1% of $33b (Exhibit A). The cost of Traffic is $38m, and the cost of Analysis can reach
  482. as high as $1.5b. $2,027m + $570m + $38m + $1,500m = $4,135m.
  483. X. CITATIONS
  484. 1.
  485. Olzak, Tom (2007, May 3). Protect your network against fiber hacks. Retrieved July 18, 2009
  486. ,
  487.  from
  488. TechRepublic Web site:
  489. http://blogs.techrepublic.com.com/security/?p=222&tag=nl.e036
  490. .
  491. 2.
  492. (2004). Map of U.S. city connectivity. Retrieved July 18, 2009
  493. ,
  494.  from TeleGeography Web site: 2.
  495. http://www.telegeography.com/ee/free_resources/figures/ib-04.php
  496. .
  497. 3.
  498. (2006). Submarine cable system diagram. Retrieved July 18, 2009
  499. ,
  500.  from TeleGeography Web site:
  501. http://www.telegeography.com/ee/free_resources/figures/ib-02.php
  502. .
  503. 4.
  504. List of Internet exchange points by size. (2009). In Wikipedia [Web]. Retrieved July 18, 2009
  505. ,
  506.  from
  507. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Internet_exchange_points_by_size
  508. .
  509. 5.
  510. Information awareness office. (2009). In Wikipedia [Web]. Retrieved July 18, 2009
  511. ,
  512.  from
  513. http://
  514. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Information_Awareness_Office
  515. .
  516. 6.
  517. Nash equilibrium. (2009). In Wikipedia [Web]. Retrieved July 18, 2009
  518. ,
  519.  from
  520. http://
  521. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nash_equilibrium
  522. .
  523. 7.
  524. Brams, S
  525. .
  526. , & Kilgour, D
  527. .
  528.  (1991).
  529. Game theory and national security
  530. .
  531. New York: Wiley-Blackwell.
  532. 8.
  533. Libbenga, Jan (2005, Nov 28). Iceland left in the cold after cable cut. The Register, Retrieved July
  534. 18, 2009
  535. ,
  536.  from
  537. http://www.theregister.co.uk/2005/11/28/iceland_without_broadband
  538. .
  539. 9.
  540. (2005). Navy commissions spy submarine Jimmy Carter. Retrieved July 18, 2009
  541. ,
  542.  from Cryptome
  543. Web site:
  544. http://eyeball-series.org/mmp/jimmy-carter.htm
  545. .
  546. 10.
  547. (2001). Ships, sensors, and weapons. Undersea Warfare, 3, Retrieved July 18, 2009
  548. ,
  549.  from
  550. http://
  551. www.navy.mil/navydata/cno/n87/usw/issue_11/ship_sensors_weapons.html
  552. .
  553. 11.
  554. Kent, S.
  555. , & Atkinson, R.
  556.  (1998). IP encapsulating security payload. Retrieved July 18, 2009
  557. ,
  558.  from
  559. The Internet Engineering Task Force Web site:
  560. http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2406
  561. .
  562. 12.
  563. Pike, J. (1996). Intelligence agency budgets. Retrieved July 18, 2009
  564. ,
  565.  from Federation of American
  566. Scientists Web site:
  567. http://www.fas.org/irp/commission/budget.htm
  568. .
  569. 13.
  570. (2007, May 3). HP launches DRAGON to help telecoms manage data in fight against global
  571. terrorism . Retrieved July 18, 2009
  572. ,
  573.  from PR Domain Web site:
  574. http://www.prdomain.com/
  575. companies/H/HP/newsreleases/20075440637.htm
  576. .
  577. 14.
  578. O'Brien, D. (2008, June 15). Sweden and the borders of the surveillance state. Retrieved July 18,
  579. 2009
  580. ,
  581.  from Electronic Frontier Foundation Web site:
  582. http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2008/06/
  583. sweden-and-borders-surveillance-state
  584. .
  585. 15.
  586. (2009). NarusInsight is the most scalable traffic intelligence system for capturing, analyzing and
  587. correlating IP traffic in real time. Retrieved July 18, 2009
  588. ,
  589.  from Narus Web site:
  590. http://
  591. narus.com/index.php/product
  592. .
  593. 16.
  594. (2008). About BND. Retrieved July 18, 2009
  595. ,
  596.  from Bundesnachrichtendienst Web site:
  597. http://
  598. www.bnd.de/nn_1435078/EN/WirUeberUns/WirUeberUns__node.html
  599. .
  600. 17.
  601. Pike, J. (2009). World wide military expenditures. Retrieved July 18, 2009
  602. ,
  603.  from Global Security
  604. Web site:
  605. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/spending.htm
  606. .
  607. 18.
  608. (2006).
  609. Directive 2006/24/EC of the European parliament and of the council. Official Journal of the
  610. European Union, 105, 54-62.
  611.  Retrieved on July 18, 2009, from  
  612. http://www.ispai.ie/DR%20as
  613. %20published%20OJ%2013-04-06.pdf
  614. .
  615. 19.
  616. Krempl, S
  617. .
  618.  (2009, June 7). CCC: Vorratsdatenspeicherung bringt unkontrollierbare Überwachung.
  619. Heise, Retrieved July 18, 2009
  620. ,
  621.  from
  622. http://www.heise.de/newsticker/CCC-
  623. Vorratsdatenspeicherung-bringt-unkontrollierbare-Ueberwachung--/meldung/141623
  624. .
  625. 20.
  626.  Zetter, K. (2009, June 22). WSJ: Nokia, Siemens help Iran spy on internet users. Retrieved July 18,
  627. 2009
  628. ,
  629.  from Wired Web site:
  630. http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/06/wsj-nokia-and-siemens-
  631. help-iran-spy-on-internet-users
  632. .
  633. 21.
  634. Cheung, H. (2006, June 27). ISP heavyweights join forces to fight child porn. Retrieved July 18,
  635. 2009
  636. ,
  637.  from TG Daily Web site:
  638. http://www.tgdaily.com/content/view/27256/118
  639. .
  640. 22.
  641. Bundeskriminalamt. (2006). The Bundeskriminalamt Profile [Brochure]. Bad Homburg, Germany
  642. .  
  643. Retrieved on July 18, 2009, from:  
  644. http://www.bka.de/profil/broschueren/profile2006.pdf
  645. 23.
  646. Latent semantic analysis. (2009). In Wikipedia [Web]. Retrieved July 18, 2009
  647. ,
  648.  from
  649. http://
  650. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Latent_semantic_analysis
  651. .
  652. 24.
  653. Li, J., Zheng, R., & Chen, H. (2008). From fingerprint to writeprint. University of Arizona
  654. .  
  655. Retrieved from  
  656. http://ai.eller.arizona.edu/COPLINK/publications/CACM_From%20Fingerprint
  657. %20to%20Writeprint.pdf
  658. .
  659. 25.
  660. Chaos Computer Clubs. (2009). Stellungnahme des Chaos Computer Clubs zur
  661. Vorratsdatenspeicherung [
  662. Report
  663. ]. Germany
  664. :
  665.  Kurz, C., & Rieger, F.
  666.   Retrieved July 18, 2009,
  667. from
  668. http://www.ccc.de/vds/VDSfinal18.pdf
  669. .
  670. 26.
  671. Stokes, J. (2009, July 6). NSA's power- and money-sucking datacenter buildout continues.
  672. Retrieved July 18, 2009
  673. ,
  674.  from ARS Technica Web site:
  675. http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/
  676. 2009/07/r2e-nsas-power--and-money-sucking-datacenter-buildout-continues.ars
  677. .
  678. 27.
  679. (2004, Apr 13). Google's gmail could be blocked. Retrieved July 18, 2009
  680. ,
  681.  from BBC News Web
  682. site:
  683. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/3621169.stm
  684. .
  685. 28.
  686. Lawful interception. (2009). In Wikipedia [Web]. Retrieved July 18, 2009
  687. ,
  688.  from
  689. http://
  690. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lawful_interception
  691. .
  692. 29.
  693. Roth, D. (2009, Apr 23). Auto espionage: Koenigsegg dealer caught spying on competing Ferrari
  694. dealer. Retrieved July 18, 2009
  695. ,
  696.  from Auto Blog Web site:
  697. http://www.autoblog.com/
  698. 2009/04/23/auto-espionage-aston-dealer-caught-spying-on-competing-ferrari
  699. .
  700. 30.
  701. Anderson, N. (2007, Sept 3). Pentago hacked, Chinese army suspected: Report. Retrieved July 18,
  702. 2009
  703. ,
  704.  from ARS Technica Web site:
  705. http://arstechnica.com/security/news/2007/09/chinese-
  706. military-accused-of-hacking-pentagon-computers.ars
  707. .
  708. 31.
  709. Open source intelligence. (2009). In Wikipedia [Web]. Retrieved July 18, 2009
  710. ,
  711.  from
  712. http://
  713. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open_Source_Intelligence
  714. .
  715. 32.
  716. Soghoian, C. (2007, Sept 16). Tor anonymity server admin arrested. Retrieved July 18, 2009
  717. ,
  718.  from
  719. Cnet Web site:
  720. http://news.cnet.com/8301-13739_3-9779225-46.html
  721. .
  722. 33.
  723. Lemos, R. (2007, Mar 8). Tor hack proposed to catch criminals. Retrieved July 18, 2009
  724. ,
  725.  from
  726. Security Focus Web site:
  727. http://www.securityfocus.com/news/11447?ref=rss
  728. .
  729. 34.
  730. (2009). Who uses Tor?. Retrieved July 18, 2009
  731. ,
  732.  from Tor Project Web site:
  733. http://
  734. www.torproject.org/torusers.html.en#activists
  735. .
  736. 35.
  737. Gray, P. (2007, Nov 13). The hack of the year. Retrieved July 18, 2009
  738. ,
  739.  from The Sydney Morning
  740. Herald Web site:
  741. http://www.smh.com.au/news/security/the-hack-of-the-year/
  742. 2007/11/12/1194766589522.html
  743. .
  744. 36.
  745. Deanonymizer (2009).  
  746. http://deanonymizer.com
  747. .
  748. 37.
  749. (2008, May 7). German intelligence caught spying on journalist's emails. EDRI-gram, 6, Retrieved
  750. July 18, 2009
  751. ,
  752.  from
  753. http://www.edri.org/edrigram/number6.9/german-intelligence-emails
  754. .
  755. 38.
  756. Davies, B. (2005). The spycraft manual: The insider's guide to espionage techniques. St. Paul, MN:
  757. Zenith Press.
  758. 39.
  759. Schneier, B. (2008, Feb 5). Fourth undersea cable failure in Middle East. Retrieved July 18, 2009
  760. ,
  761. from Schneier Web site:
  762. http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/02/fourth_undersea.html
  763. .
  764. 40.
  765. Acohido, B. (2009, Apr 9). Q&A on U.S. electrical grid infiltrated by Chinese, Russian cyberspies.
  766. Retrieved July 18, 2009
  767. ,
  768.  from The Last Watchdog Web site:
  769. http://lastwatchdog.com/chinese-
  770. russian-cyberspies-lurk-us-electrical-grid
  771. .
  772.